

Honorable Roswell Gilpatric  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Ros:

On 8 March Ed Black at your request sent me the JCS paper of 2 March 1961 on "The Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency." I had mentioned this to you at our last Wednesday's luncheon.

I appreciate the purposes of this exercise and am well aware that many of the issues discussed touch my own responsibilities only generally. Of these there is one upon which I feel some need for clarification: The relationship between the MIA discussed in the early paragraphs and the separate service intelligence organizations discussed in paragraph 7. This latter paragraph can be read as expressing a philosophy differing from that which underlies the JCS paper as a whole.

As to matters which lie closer to my own responsibilities, the enclosed memorandum raises the issues which I would like to take up with you.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

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MEMORANDUM RE JCS PAPER OF 2 MARCH 1961 ENTITLED  
"THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY"

1. Military Intelligence Board (JCS-117-61, page 1, para. 3)

I fully recognize the importance of a consultative group during the period of transition when matters pertaining to the reorganization will have to have the consideration of the several parties at interest. You will understand my concern lest this Board become a formalized institution whose activities would, in part, duplicate those within the responsibility of the United States Intelligence Board. With such a Board, the DOD position may become fixed and formalized on certain intelligence issues even before the DOD members of USIB had the opportunity to consider the views of other USIB members.

2. Membership on USIB (Appendix, page 4, para. 4)

I would welcome any arrangements the Secretary of Defense desires for representation of the defense agencies on the USIB. The only point I would stress is that the membership of the Board should take into account the location of the actual substantive intelligence-producing resources of the Department. So long as these remain with the Services, they should participate in the final process of developing national estimates and in dealing with problems relating to intelligence collection priorities, etc. I would also urge that the Director, NSA, remain a member of USIB because of the latter's responsibility for policy guidance to NSA and the dependence of the Department of State and CIA on the effective performance of NSA's functions.

3. Relation of NSA to the JCS (Appendix, page 5, para. 5g(3))

Where the responsibility for the management of NSA is placed within the DOD should, of course, be determined by the Secretary of Defense. Whatever that determination may be, I would stress the importance of retaining, undisturbed, the responsibility of USIB to give NSA policy guidance and to insure that the pressing needs of all USIB members were adequately served. I see no reason to change the present arrangements which lodge management in the DOD.



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4. Current Intelligence (Appendix, page 5, para. 5c(2))

The planned current intelligence publication by replacing several existing dailies now produced by the Services is, I feel, an important step in the direction of consolidation and elimination of duplication in departmental military current intelligence. I gather from the proposed charter that it will include not only military intelligence items but also political, economic, and sociological intelligence without provision of "coordination" outside the Department of Defense. It is not clear whether the proposal outlined in Annex C describes a departmental intelligence daily for elements of the DOD or contemplates dissemination to the President and governmental agencies other than DOD. To insure that the new publication does not parallel or duplicate the Central Intelligence Bulletin, I believe that their relationship should be clarified.

At the time the Planning and Coordination Staff, MIA, considers the feasibility of establishing a single military indications center in MIA, consideration should be given to the merger of that function under the National Indications Center. This is not to say that there is no requirement for something like a military combat information center in MIA.

5. Collection Requirements Facility and Registry (Appendix, page 3, para. 5c)

The Collection Requirements Registry appears to be a step in the right direction, but it must be remembered that proper consolidation of requirements--military, political, and economic--is the real objective of the Joint Study Group. Moreover, just as nonmilitary collectors may frequently be able to service military requirements, so military collectors may often be in the best position to service requirements from other members of the community. The matter of establishing an appropriate community-wide requirements facility and registry is currently under study by an interagency group, and it would seem most desirable to phase the creation of any separate military facility along with the development of the overall arrangement so that unnecessary duplication and bottlenecks can be avoided.

6. Military Attaches (Appendix, page 3, para. 5f)

We value the intelligence gathering work of the Attache Services not only in matters purely military but also in many countries of the world for their relationships with, and insights into, key personalities in government, who, increasingly these days, are military men. We hope that arrangements can be made for attache coverage of many geographical areas as yet uncovered.

7. MAAG Collaboration (Appendix, page 3, para. 5g(1))

The integration of appropriate MAAG reporting activities into the military intelligence machinery as provided for by the JCS in September 1959, and reaffirmed in the present proposals, is most desirable.

8. Research and Development (Appendix, page 4, para. 5h)

The proposal with respect to research and development, review and coordination is a minimum.

9. Estimates (Appendix, page 7, para. 5g(5))

The meaning of this paragraph is not clear to me. In view of CIA's statutory responsibilities in the fields of intelligence relating to national security, I am particularly interested in any procedures affecting national estimates, not only as they are touched upon in this paragraph but elsewhere in the memorandum. The following points indicate areas where clarification would be most welcome:

a. The link between the estimates of the MIA and the National Intelligence Estimates.

b. The relationship between contributions to USIB estimates from the Director, MIA, and the Director of Intelligence, J-2, the Joint Staff.

c. The method by which USIB could continue to have the benefit of the views and research of particular service intelligence agencies.

10. J-2, Joint Staff (Appendix, page 6, para. 6)

Responsibilities set forth for the J-2 seem to be somewhat duplicative of those to be assumed by the MIA, and possibly some clarification should be sought.

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